(No abstract is available for this citation).

Professor Strawson's paper is refreshing in content as well as refreshingly intemperate. It is salutary to be reminded that even the Type Identity Theory does not entail physicalism as that doctrine is usually understood (since c-fiber firings are not by definition purely physical). And it's fun to consider versions of panpsychism. I can see why Strawson finds his position hard to classify (p. 7), and I sympathize. In my title I have cast my own vote for '?-ism' on the grounds (...) that any familiar label would be either misleading or unwieldy. My main purpose here is to assess Strawson's case for panpsychism and then to offer some objections to panpsychism, but first I want to answer an interesting and serious charge he makes against me. (shrink)

This paper compares the attempts of hare, Singer and gewirth to provide the trivially true universalizability principle with normative content. The programs of hare and singer share an inability to convict the sincere fanatic ( the servant of an immoral but aesthetically compelling ideal) of moral inconsistency. Gewirth avoids the "fanatic" pitfall by adding some purely logical footwork; but his system too admits of important indeterminacies which may or may not prove fatal, E.G., The handling of morally tolerable coercion and (...) of the occasional duty to repair damage caused by someone else. (shrink)

CHARLES HARTSHORNE, in Anselm’s Discovery, begins his attempt to save the Ontological Argument by claiming that its latter half has been ‘conveniently ignored’ by its critics through nine centuries of debate. His own contentions center around a slightly updated version of Anselm’s ‘second’ Argument, as found in Proslogium III I paraphrase his reasoning as follows.